We derive efficient guidelines for scheduling dataparallel computations within a draconian mode of cyclestealing in networks of workstations wherein an interruption by the owner of the "borrowed" workstation kills all jobs currently in progress. We derive both adaptive and non-adaptive scheduling guidelines that maximize, up to low-order additive terms, the amount of work that one is guaranteed to accomplish during a cycle-stealing opportunity, no matter when the opportunity is interrupted-up to a prespecified number of times.
Cycle-Stealing in Clusters
Many sources eloquently argue the technological and economic inevitability of an increasingly common modality of parallel computation, the use of a network of workstations (NOW) as a parallel computer; see, e.g., [8] . Numerous sources describe systems that facilitate the mechanics of NOW-based computing, especially via cycle stealing-the use by one workstation of idle computing cycles of another. However, few sources study the problem of scheduling individual computations on NOWs; even fewer present models that facilitate such scheduling for broad classes of computations. In the current paper, we refine the model developed in [3] and derive guidelines for crafting cycle-stealing schedules for data-parallel computations, which approximately maximize the amount of work that one is guaranteed to accomplish during a cycle-stealing opportunity.
Background.
In [3] , we developed and studied a mathematical model for the problem of scheduling dataparallel computations under the following draconian version of cycle-stealing. The owner of workstation A contracts with the owner of workstation B to take control of B's This contract creates the following challenge. On the one hand, the threat of losing work in progress when an interrupt occurs recommends breaking each cycle-stealing opportunity into many short "periods," supplying small amounts of work to B each time. On the other hand, the expensive setup time for the inter-workstation communications that bracket each period-to supply work to B and to reclaim the results of that work-recommends breaking each opportunity into a small number of long periods, supplying large amounts of work to B each time. In order to schedule a cycle-stealing opportunity productively, one must balance these conflicting factors judiciously.
The model in [3] is two-faceted, comprising one submodel that focuses on the expected work production of a cycle-stealing opportunity and one that focuses on the guaranteed work production. Recognizing that cycle-stealing can accomplish productive work only if the "malicious adversary" is restrained from interrupting every period when B is doing work for A, just before B returns its results, both submodels assume some idealized knowledge that restrains the adversary. The guaranteed-output submodel-our focus here-assumes that the owner of A knows both the total amount of time that B will be available and an upper bound on the number of possible interruptions.
We derived in [3] exactly optimal schedules for a small number of specific scenarios under each of the two submodels, using techniques that were specific to each scenario. In the current paper and its companion [9] (which focuses on the expected-output submodel), we have sought broadly applicable guidelines that produce nearly optimal schedules for large classes of scenarios.
Our Main Results.
In Section 3, we present two computationally efficient sets of scheduling guidelines: One set produces optimal non-adaptive schedules-that do not change their strategy until all possible interrupts have occurred; one set produces adaptive schedules-that change strategy in response to each interrupt-which are optimal to within low-order additive terms.
Related Work.
The few algorithmic studies of cyclestealing in the literature approach the scheduling problem rather differently. In [1] , a cycle-stealing schedule within a NOW is crafted by "auctioning off" large identical chunks of a compute-intensive task. The companion papers [5, 6] schedule directed acyclic graphs on a NOW in a way that optimizes system time and space requirements. In [2] , cycle-stealing is but one application of a theory of how to make random decisions better than by random choices, within a logarithmic factor of optimally. Finally, in [3, 9] and the current paper, cycle-stealing is viewed as a game against an adversary who seeks to minimize the work production of a cycle-stealing opportunity by "maliciously" interrupting the borrowed workstation.
A Formal Model
2.1. The General Framework. Our schedules operate in an "architecture-independent" fashion [7] : the single parameter c represents the cost of setting up the paired communications in which workstation A sends work to workstation B and B returns the results of the work. We assume that: tasks are indivisible; task times may vary but are known perfectly; the time allotted to a task includes the marginal cost of transmitting its input and output data.
Our framework: (a) keeps c independent of the amount of data transmitted; (b) is consistent with both "pull"-and "push"-oriented scheduling philosophies.
We characterize a cycle-stealing opportunity via two quantities: 
3.2.
Adaptive Schedules.
We now present and begin to analyze our adaptive opportunity-schedule 
Theoretical Underpinnings
We view cycle-stealing as a game against a "malicious adversary" who seeks to use the p available interrupts to minimize the work production of our cycle-stealing opportunity, even as we seek to maximize this production. The first move is ours. Based on the current values of L and p, we invoke episode-schedule S p L . As long as the adversary still has available interrupts (i.e., p 0), s/he will decide either to let the current episode play out without an interrupt or to interrupt some period, thereby nullifying some of our usable lifespan. If s/he does interrupt us, say at time t of the current episode, then when we regain control of B, we invoke episode-schedule S p,1 L , t . The game continues until p = 0 , at which point the adversary cannot prevent our working until the end of the residual lifespan.
We approach this "game" via bootstrapping, always as- We see now that only some of the adversary's apparent options concerning interrupts are actually viable. We begin with a result that has three significant consequences: (1) narrowing our search for optimal schedules; (2) allowing us to use ordinary, rather than positive, subtraction when computing an episode's potential work; (3) leading to two significant observations about the adversary's strategy. The result shows that we may restrict attention to schedules that are productive, in the sense of having all period-lengths, save perhaps the last in each episode, strictly exceed c. Proof Sketch. If the ith nonterminal period of the kth constituent episode-schedule S k of is nonproductive, then one alters by combining periods i and i + 1 of S k .
We actually concentrate on episode-schedules that are fully productive, in the sense of having all period-lengths broad range of relevant U, which precludes a simple asymptotic analysis. (U is commensurate with c toward the end of an episode.) These approximate values are summarized in 
